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JURISDICTION
Plaintiffs and appellants Robert and Jackie Face appeal a final order of the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granting defendants and
appellees Beutler Enterprises, Inc.'s, Mobile Home Transporters', and Byron C.
Mock's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. The Utah Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) and Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE #1: Did the trial court properly exercise its broad discretion in
dismissing the Faces complaint for failure to prosecute where the record showed that
the Faces failed to appear or appoint counsel in the nine months following their
counsel's withdrawal, the Faces allowed their case to lie dormant for over nine
months, and the Faces failed to oppose defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Prosecute?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision
within the broad discretion of the trial court." Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure
Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Ut Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277
(Utah 1987). "An appellate court, therefore, 'will not interfere with that decision
unless it clearly appears that the court has abused its discretion and that there is a
likelihood an injustice has been wrought.'" Country Meadows v. Dept. of Health, 851
P.2d 1212, 1214 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Charlie Brown Constr., 740 P.2d at
1370). This issue was preserved in the trial court. (R. 160-164).
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ISSUE #2: Should this Court refuse to consider issues raised by the Faces for
the first time on appeal, including their objection to the withdrawal of their counsel,
their alleged violation of due process, their alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and request for costs and fees?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court will not consider arguments raised for
the first time on appeal. Coombs v. Juice Works Development, Inc., 2003 UT App
388 fn 3; 81 P.3d 769. The trial court did not consider or rule upon these issues, the
issues were not preserved for appeal, and there is no decision for this Court to review.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES & REGULATIONS
Utah R. Civ. P. 41

Addendum Tab 1

Utah R. Civ. P. 74

Addendum Tab 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE: This appeal arises out of a lawsuit filed on March
14, 2003 by plaintiffs and appellants Robert and Jackie Face (collectively "the Faces").
(R. 1-5). The Faces allege that defendants and appellees Beutler Enterprises, Inc.,
Mobile Home Transporters, and Byron C. Mock (collectively "the defendants")
negligently operated a tractor-trailer causing personal injury to Mr. Face. (R. 1-5).
Mr. Face alleged he sustained personal injuries in the accident while Mrs. Face alleged
a loss of consortium claim. (R. 1-5).
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: The defendants timely answered the Faces'
complaint. (R. 9-12). Subsequently, an attorney planning meeting was held, and on
May 13, 2003 counsel filed an attorney planning meeting report and proposed
scheduling order. (R. 22-28). The trial court declined to enter the proposed
scheduling order because it exceeded the presumptive time limits provided for by
Court rules. (R. 29). Counsel submitted an amended Case Management Order that
was entered by the trial court on May 28, 2003. (R. 31-37). In that order, the parties
stated that the case should be ready for trial by March 5, 2004. (R. 35).
The parties exchanged initial disclosures and conducted discovery through the
balance of 2003. (R. 160). On or about December 23, 2003, the parties submitted a
Stipulation and Joint Motion for a second amendment to the Case Management Order.
(R. 78-83). The court accepted the stipulation and signed the proposed second
amended Order. (R. 78-83). That Order extended the readiness for trial date to
October 1,2004. (R. 82).
The parties continued to conduct discovery through January 2005. (R. 103).
On August 2, 2005, the trial court, on its own motion, ordered the parties to
appear in court on September 6, 2005 and show cause why the case should not be
dismissed for failure to prosecute. (R. 105). In response, on August 15, 2005, the
Faces' counsel filed a Certificate of Readiness for Trial. The trial court then scheduled
a phone conference with the parties' counsel for October 5, 2006.
On September 16, 2005, the trial court held a telephone conference with Faces'
attorney, Charles Gruber, and defendants' attorney, Terry Plant. In that conference,
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Mr. Gruber informed the trial court that his clients were seeking new counsel and that
he intended to withdraw as counsel for the Faces. (R. 182, p. 2-3). The trial court
ordered that the Faces had twenty days from September 16, 2005 to appear or appoint
counsel. (R. 182, p. 4). Mr. Gruber stated that he would telephone the Faces and also
send them a letter to inform them of his withdrawal and their obligation to appear or
appoint counsel within twenty days. (R. 182, p. 6). Also, the trial court requested that
Mr. Plant prepare an Order reflecting Mr. Gruber's withdrawal, the Faces' obligation
to appear or appoint counsel within 20 days, and that a scheduling conference would
be held with the court on October 18, 2005 to set a trial date. (R. 182, p. 5-6).
On September 23, 2005, Mr. Gruber filed with the Court a "Notice of
Withdrawal of Charles A. Gruber as Attorney for Plaintiff Jackie Face" and a "Notice
of Withdrawal of Charles A. Gruber as Attorney for Plaintiff Robert Face," and he
served copies of both notices to the Faces and defendants' counsel. (R. 117-118, 119120). On September 27, 2005, defendants' counsel filed a "Notice to Appear or
Appoint Counsel" informing the Faces of their responsibility to appear or appoint
counsel within 20 days, as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 74. (R. 121-122). On
September 28, 2005, the trial court entered an Order requiring that the Faces appear or
appoint counsel by October 5, 2005 and setting a telephone scheduling conference for
October 18, 2005. (R. 123-125).
On October 17, 2005, the Faces filed an ex parte Motion for Enlargement of
Time to Appear or Appoint Counsel. (R. 128-129). On October 18, 2005, the trial
court held a telephonic scheduling conference with defendants' counsel and the Faces.
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(R. 183). The trial court granted the Faces request to have until November 18, 2005 to
appear or appoint counsel. (R. 183, 2-3).
On November 17, 2005, the Faces again filed an ex parte Motion for
Enlargement of Time to Appear or Appoint Counsel. (R. 139-140). This time the
Faces requested an additional sixty days to obtain counsel. (R. 139-140). No
additional pleadings were filed and no proceedings were held until February 14, 2006
when defendants' filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. (R. 150-151).
The Faces did not file any pleadings in opposition to defendants' Motion to
Dismiss. Instead, they filed a "Motion for Additional Time to Have New Counsel
Respond to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss." (R. 152). Thereafter, they did not file
any responsive pleading to defendants' Motion to Dismiss. On June 16, 2006,
defendants filed a Notice to Submit for Decision their Motion to Dismiss. (R. 158).
The Faces did not respond to defendants' Notice to Submit.
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT: On June 28, 2006, Judge Denise
Posse Lindberg entered a lengthy "Memorandum Decision Granting Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute." (R. 160-164). Judge Lindberg's decision stated that
the memorandum decision would serve as the final order and judgment in the case.
(R. 163).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This action arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on August

9, 2000 in Salt Lake County, Utah. (R. 1-5). In their Complaint filed on March 14,
2003, the Faces alleged the accident involved a vehicle owned and operated by Robert
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Face and a tractor-trailer owned and operated by defendants. (R. 1-5). Mr. Face
alleged he sustained personal injuries in the accident. His wife, Jackie Face, alleged a
loss of consortium claim. (R. 1-5).
2.

On April 10, 2003, defendants answered the Faces' Complaint and

denied all claims of negligence. (R. 9-13).
3.

On May 12, 2003, the parties filed with the trial court an Attorney's

Planning Meeting Report and Case Management Order. (R. 22-28).
4.

In a Minute Entry dated May 12, 2003, the trial court rejected the

proposed Case Management Order because the proposed dates exceeded the
"presumptive limits of Rule 4-103, Code of Judicial Administration." (R. 29).
5.

On May 28, 2003, the parties filed an Amended Attorneys' Planning

Meeting Report and Case Management Order. (R. 31-37). The parties stated that the
matter would be ready for trial by March 5, 2004. (R. 31-37). The trial court signed
the Order on May 28, 2003. (R. 31-37).
6.

Throughout 2003, the parties exchanged and answered written discovery

and took depositions. (R. 40-77).
7.

On December 23, 2003, the parties filed a Stipulation and Joint Motion

to Extend Discovery Deadlines and to Modify Attorney Planning Meeting Report and
Prior Discovery Order and Order. (R. 78-83). The parties stated that the matter would
be ready for trial after October 1, 2004. (R. 82). The trial court signed the Order on
December 23, 2003. (R. 82).
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8.

The parties, primarily defendants, continued to take depositions through

January 2005. (R. 93-104).
9.

On August 2, 2005, the trial court, on its own motion, ordered the parties

to appear before the court on September 6, 2005 and show cause why the case should
not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (R. 105).
10.

On August 15, 2005, the Faces' counsel filed Plaintiffs5 Certificate of

Readiness for Trial and requested that the trial court dismiss its Notice of Order to
Show Cause. (R. 108-110).
11.

On August 23, 2005, the trial court sent the parties a Notice of Phone

Conference for Scheduling. (R. 111-113). The conference was set for October 5,
2005 for the purpose of discussing "trial dates, discovery completion dates, jury or
non-jury trial, trial length, dates for dispositive motions, dates for exchange of witness
lists, nature and complexity of case, final pretrial date and settlement status." (R. 111113).
12.

On September 15, 2005, the trial court sent the parties a Notice of

Hearing informing that a hearing was scheduled for October 18, 2005. (R. 114-116).
13.

On September 16, 2006, the trial court held a telephone conference with

the Faces counsel, Charles M. Gruber, and defendants' counsel, Terry M. Plant. (R.
182). (A transcript of the hearing is attached hereto as Attachment 1.) During the
conference, Mr. Gruber motioned the trial court to withdraw as counsel for the Faces:
I will withdraw at the direction of my clients, your Honor. They have
taken the files back from me about 10 days ago. They informed me that
they were looking for another attorney, or at least, as I understand I, a
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second opinion - - a new attorney in this case. I sent a letter confirming
that.
I made an agreement with them that I would - - it wouldn't be any sort of
- - they wouldn't fall through the cracks and I would continue to make
appearances for them on the telephone status conference and that I would
be available for Terry to contact me so there wouldn't be a break in
communications either between defense counsel and the plaintiff or
between the Court and plaintiffs.
I have not heard back from them. I have confirmed that in a letter to
them. So it is my understanding that they are going to be substituting in
another counsel. I have not heard from other counsel. It's been about 10
days since they took the files, and I haven't heard from them. They do
have the file, and that's what's going to be happening, that someone will
be substituting in, it's my understanding, on my behalf. I told them I
would stand in for them because I don't want them to be hurt for this
kind of interim period. That's where we are, your Honor.
(R. 182, p. 2-3).
14.

The trial court and counsel then had the following exchange:

The Court:

All right. Mr. Plant?

Mr. Plant:
Well, your Honor, my - - and I understand, and Mr. Gruber
explained that yesterday very well. My concern was - - and I understand
why the Court got us back on the phone, that there would be some sort of
a deadline for them to take care of this counsel issue.
The Court: That's right. I mean I had this set up for a scheduling
conference to set a trial date.
Mr. Plant: Uh-huh.
The Court: Mr. Gruber, I don't want this to cause this matter to kind of,
you know, drag on indefinitely.
Mr. Gruber: Sure, and your Honor, I can assure you this isn't a tactic,
and I know Terry knows this that I wouldn't do this, but it's not - - it's
my clients honestly want someone else.
The Court: I'm not concerned about that.

8

Mr. Plant: No one is suggesting that.
The Court: Yeah, not concerned about that at all.
Mr. Plant: I just think, your Honor, this thing has languished so long and
we - - you know, we need to - - we just need to have a date certain for
them to do whatever they're going to do so we can move this case along.
The Court: That's entirely appropriate and correct. So why don't we
say 20 days from today in which to appear or appoint counsel. Then
let's have a scheduling conference set - - we'll set it for 20 days out.
(R. 182, p. 3-4). With respect to Mr. Gruber's withdrawal as counsel, the
Court further stated:
The Court: One way or another we're moving forward. Now if Mr.
Gruber were to withdraw right now, there would be an automatic 20 day
period in which he would be required to give notice - Mr. Plant: Right.
The Court: - - and this is effectively the same thing, but we have the
benefit of having Mr. Gruber here and being able to communicate with
his clients.
Mr. Gruber: I will call them and send a letter to them.
The Court: All right. That would be perfect.
(R. 182,5-6).
15.

The trial court asked Mr. Plant to prepare an Order directing the

Faces to appear or appoint counsel within 20 days of September 16, 2005 and
setting a scheduling conference for October 18, 2005. (R. 182, p. 5-6).
16.

On September 23, 2005, Mr. Gruber filed pleadings indicating his

withdrawal as counsel for Robert and Jackie Face. (R. 117-120). Mr. Gruber
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served copies of the pleadings to the Faces. (R. 117-120).
17.

On September 27, 2005, defendants' counsel filed a Notice to Appear or

Appoint Successor Counsel and served a copy to the Faces. (R. 121-122). This notice
informed the Faces that pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 74, no further proceedings would
be held in the case until 20 days after the filing of the notice, but after those 20 days
additional proceedings would be held. (R. 121-122).
18.

On September 28, 2005, the trial court entered a Scheduling Order,

prepared by Mr. Plant, stating that the Faces must find new counsel or appear in
person by October 5, 2005. The Scheduling Order also set a telephone scheduling
conference with the court for October 18, 2005. (R. 123-125).
19.

On October 17, 2005, the Faces filed with the trial court an "Ex-Parte

Motion for Enlargement of Time to Appoint Counsel." (R. 128-129). In their motion,
the Faces requested "an Order granting an enlargement of time of at least 30 days to
obtain counsel." (R. 128).
20.

On October 18, 2005, the trial court held a telephone conference with the

Faces, appearing pro se, and Mr. Plant, defendants' counsel. (R. 183). (A copy of the
transcript is attached hereto as Attachment 2.) The Faces requested until November
18, 2005 to obtain counsel, and the trial court and defendants' counsel agreed to the
request:
The Court: All right. I had this set for scheduling purposes, and I've
received and I've just reviewed, Mr. Face, your ex parte application for
an enlargement of time. I'm certainly not opposed to extending the time
for the Faces to obtain counsel.
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Mr. Plant: Your Honor, I told Mrs. Face - - she called me - - this is
Terry Plant - - about a week ago or so that I would give her - - agreed to,
I think - - Mrs. Face, was it the 18th of November that we agreed to?
The Court: Mr. Face, you should send Mr. Plant a copy of the ex parte
enlarge - - motion for enlargement of time. That's what was represented
in the ex parte enlargement as well. I certainly appreciate that and think
it's entirely appropriate.
Mr. Plant: Your Honor, I have no objection. In fact, I already agreed to
it subject only to your approval.
The Court: Yeah. Well, I certainly appreciate that. I mean that's
entirely appropriate under the circumstances. Mr. and Mrs. Face, I think
it - - will November 18th give you sufficient time?
Ms. Face: Your Honor, that would be of great help to us if you could do
that.
The Court: Of course. That's not a problem. In fact, Mr. Plant, I'm
going to ask that you prepare the order extending the time for Mr. and
Mrs. Face to appear or appoint counsel to November the 18th.
(R. 183, p. 2-3).
21.

On October 25, 2005, defendants' counsel served to the Faces and filed

with the trial court a proposed Order stating that the Faces had until the close of
business on November 18, 2005 to appear or appoint counsel. (R. 136-138).
22.

On November 17, 2005, the Faces again filed an "Ex Parte Motion for

Additional Time to Appoint Counsel." (R. 139-140).
23.

No additional pleadings were filed with the trial court and no further

action was taken in the case until February 14, 2006 when defendants filed a Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 41. (R. 150-151).

11

Counsel still had not entered an appearance on behalf of the Faces, and the Faces had
yet to enter an appearance on their own behalf. (R. 144-149).
24.

In response to defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Faces filed on

February 27, 2006 a "Motion for Additional Time to have New Counsel Respond to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss." (R. 152-153).
25.

Defendants waited until June 16, 2006 to submit their motion to dismiss

for decision by the trial court. (R. 158-159). Counsel still had not entered an
appearance on behalf of the Faces, the Faces had yet to enter an appearance on their
own behalf, and no opposition to defendants' motion had been filed. (R. 158-159).
26.

The Faces did not respond to defendants' Notice to Submit. (R. 161).

27.

On June 28, 2006, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision

Granting Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. (R. 160-163). The trial court's
decision is four-pages long and contains a factual background, legal analysis and
conclusions of law. (R. 160-163). The trial court's decision detailed the Faces' failure
to prosecute their case, and noted that the defendants actively pursued the action. (R.
160-163). The court concluded that dismissal with prejudice was a harsh sanction, but
that the facts of the case amply justified such a sanction. (R. 162).
28.

On July 26, 2006, the Faces filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 165).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of the Faces' complaint for
their failure to prosecute. Under Utah law, dismissal for failure to prosecute is within
the broad discretion of the trial court and the trial court's decision will not be disturbed
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absent an abuse of that discretion. Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
The record shows that after the Faces' counsel entered his withdrawal in September
2005, the Faces failed to appear or appoint counsel despite receiving notice from both
the trial court and defendants' counsel of their obligation to do so. Furthermore, for
over nine months, the Faces allowed their case to lie dormant and they made no effort
to move it forward. The Faces completely neglected their obligation to prosecute their
case with due diligence. Accordingly, defendants took action to move the case toward
resolution by filing a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The Faces did not
oppose the motion. The trial court gave careful consideration to the facts of the case
and applying well-settled Utah law correctly determined that dismissal was
appropriate. Indeed, this Court has stated that "plaintiffs are required 'to prosecute
their claims with due diligence or accept the penalty of dismissal.'" Charlie Brown
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987)
(quoting Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah 1975). The record clearly
establishes the Faces failed to prosecute their case with due diligence, and
consequently, dismissal of the case was a justified penalty.
Additionally, the Faces raise arguments on appeal that were not raised or
preserved in the trial court. Specifically, they contend that the withdrawal of their
counsel violated Utah R. Civ. P. 74, and also violated their right to due process and the
Americans with Disabilities Act. However, the Faces ignore the fact that they did not
lodge any objection to their counsel's withdrawal with the trial court. Furthermore,
the record evidences that the Faces' counsel's withdrawal complied with Utah R. Civ.
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P. 74, and there is no legal basis for their alleged violations of due process and the
Americans with Disabilities Act.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS BROAD
DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE FACES COMPLAINT FOR
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE BECAUSE THE FACES FAILED TO
APPEAR OR APPOINT COUNSEL AS ORDERED BY THE
COURT AND INSTEAD ALLOWED THEIR CASE TO LIE
DORMANT FOR OVER NINE MONTHS.

The case record clearly establishes that after the Faces' counsel withdrew in
September 2005, they completely failed to prosecute their claims against defendants.
Upon their counsel's withdrawal, the Faces were informed by defendants' counsel as
well as the Court of their obligation to retain new counsel or enter their own
appearance. Despite having over nine months to do so, the Faces failed to meet their
obligation. The Faces did not take any action to move their case toward resolution.
Instead, anytime action was taken on the case by either defendants' counsel or the trial
court, the Faces responded by simply requesting more time to appoint counsel.
Because of the Faces failure to take substantive action on their case, the trial court
properly exercised its broad discretion and dismissed the case.
Under well settled Utah law, "plaintiffs are required 'to prosecute their claims
with due diligence or accept the penalty of dismissal.'" Charlie Brown Constr. Co.,
Inc. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Maxfield
v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah 1975). Furthermore, with respect to a plaintiffs
failure to prosecute, this Court has stated: "Such nonaction is inexcusable, not only
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from the standpoint of the parties, but also because it constitutes an abuse of the
judicial process." Country Meadows v. Dept. of Health, 851 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Ut. Ct.
App. 1993). In cases where a plaintiff fails to prosecute their case, Utah R. Civ. P.
41(b) expressly allows the trial court to dismiss the case with prejudice. Indeed, this
Court has stated that "Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision within the broad
discretion of the trial court." Country Meadows, 851 P.2d at 1214. Utah's appellate
courts will not interfere with a trial court's dismissal for failure to prosecute absent an
abuse of discretion. Id Here, the record establishes that there was no abuse of
discretion.
Prior to the withdrawal of the Faces' counsel, the trial court was concerned by
the Faces' failure to diligently prosecute their case. Indeed, on September 6, 2005 the
trial court, on its own motion, ordered the parties to show cause as to why the case
should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (R. 105). In response, the Faces filed
a Certificate of Readiness for Trial requesting that the trial court set a pre-trial
conference in order to set a trial date. (R. 108-109). In the scheduling conference to
set a trial date, the Faces' counsel stated he would be withdrawing at the Faces'
request. (R. 182, p.2). The trial court informed counsel that regardless of counsel's
withdrawal, he would not allow the matter to drag on indefinitely. (R. 183, p. 3).
Moreover, the Court stated that regardless of whether the Faces timely appeared or
appointed counsel, the case would move forward. (R. 183, p. 6).
There can be no question that the Faces were aware of their obligation to appear
or appoint counsel and to move their case forward. To be sure, after the Faces'
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counsel entered his withdrawal the trial court held a telephone conference with the
Faces and defendants' counsel to establish a deadline for the Faces to retain counsel or
enter their own appearance. The trial court stated, "Okay. Mr. Face, the reason I
didn't scrub the telephone conference is it was purely for this purpose, to make sure
we're all on the same page and to set a time certain for you to get counsel." (R. 183, p.
4). In that October 18, 2005 telephone conference, the Faces requested thirty days to
retain counsel, and the trial court granted their request. The following exchange took
place:
The Court: Mr. and Mrs. Face, I think it - - will November 18 give you
sufficient time?
Ms. Face: Your Honor, that would be of great help to us if you could do
that.
The Court: Of course. That's not a problem. In fact, Mr. Plant, I'm
going to ask that you prepare an order extending the time for Mr. and
Mrs. Face to appear or appoint counsel to November 18th.
(R. 183, p. 3). Pursuant to the trial court's request, defendants' counsel prepared and
served upon the Faces an order stating that the Faces had until November 18, 2005 to
appoint counsel, and that if they failed to do so, the court would entertain appropriate
motions. (R. 137-138). Despite being well informed of their obligation to move their
case forward and the potential consequences of failing to do so, the Faces nevertheless
failed to obtain counsel by November 18, 2005 and took no action to move their case
forward.
Instead, on November 17, 2005, the Faces requested an additional sixty days to
appoint counsel. (R. 139-140). Despite the fact that the Faces had already had at least
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90 days to retain new counsel, the defendants and the Court did not object to the
Faces' request for an additional 60 days. By January 18, 2006, the expiration date of
the 60 day period, the Faces had again failed to appoint counsel or take any action
whatsoever to move their case forward.
Defendants' counsel then gave the Faces nearly another 30 days before filing a
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute on February 14,
2006. The Faces did not oppose defendants' motion. Instead, as per usual, they
simply requested additional time from the Court to retain counsel to oppose the
motion. (R. 152). Again, the defendants' and the Court did not object to the Faces'
request for additional time. However, by June 16, 2006, four months after defendants
filed their motion, the Faces still had not appointed counsel, had not entered their own
appearance, and had not taken any action to prosecute their case. Accordingly,
defendants filed a notice to submit their motion to dismiss for decision of the trial
court. (R. 158-159).
By this time, the trial court had allowed the Faces nearly nine months to appoint
counsel or appear on their own behalf. During that period, the Faces could have
entered their own appearance and taken any number of steps to move their case
forward. In allowing the Faces considerable time to appear or appoint counsel, the
trial court afforded the Faces an opportunity to be heard and to do justice, however the
Faces abused that opportunity through their dilatory conduct. The Faces wholly failed
to shoulder their burden of prosecuting their claims with due diligence, and dismissal
was the proper consequence of their inaction. The trial court did not abuse its broad
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discretion by dismissing the Faces' complaint. See Country Meadows v. Dept. of
Health, 851 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993).
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED UTAH LAW IN
DISMISSING THE FACES' COMPLAINT.

The trial court gave detailed consideration to defendants' motion to dismiss as
well as the totality of the circumstances of the case, and properly concluded that
dismissal was justified under well settled Utah law. Both this Court and the Utah
Supreme Court have promulgated a standard to help trial courts determine whether a
party has shown a justifiable excuse for failing to prosecute their case. (R. 161). The
five factors, in addition to the length of time elapsed, used to determine the propriety
of a dismissal for failure to prosecute include: "(1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the
opportunity each has had to move the case forward; (3) what each party has done to
move the case forward; (4) the amount of difficulty or prejudice that may have been
caused to the other side; and (5) 'most important, whether injustice may result from
the dismissal.'" Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State Univ., 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor,
Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975)). These five factors are known as the
"Westinghouse factors" and they are not to be considered in isolation, but rather the
totality of the circumstances should be considered. IdL The trial court analyzed each
factor in the context of this case and correctly concluded that the Faces failure to
prosecute their case warranted dismissal with prejudice.
The first factor considered by the trial court was the conduct of both parties.
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The trial court stated:
It has been more than three (3) years since the case was filed, more than
eighteen (18) months since there was any substantive work on this case
(and what discovery has occurred it appears to have been driven
primarily by the defendants), and over (9) months since the Court
initiated the OSC and Plaintiffs began seeking extensions of time. The
Court believes enough is enough. It is evident Plaintiffs have failed to
fulfill their repeated promises to the Court, and have been totally nonresponsive since February 2006.
The record supports the trial court's conclusion that the defendants primarily moved
the case forward by diligently conducting discovery. Specifically, in addition to
deposing the Faces, defendants' counsel also deposed three of Mr. Face's doctors (Dr.
Matsuo, Dr. Murdock, and Dr. Snyder) as well as two forensic experts designated by
the Faces (Ron Probert and Dave Ingebretsen). (R. 93-100). Conversely, the Faces
deposed only defendant Mock. (R. 65-66). And after the defendants deposed Dr.
Matsuo in January 2005, the Faces did not conduct any further discovery. The record
clearly demonstrates that prior to the Faces' counsel's withdrawal in September 2005,
the defendants were the driving force in moving the case forward.
The defendants ability to move the case forward was subsequently prejudiced
by the withdrawal of the Faces counsel in September 2005. Utah R. Civ. P. 74(b)
required the defendants to notify the Faces of their obligation to appear or appoint
counsel and also required that the proceedings be stayed until twenty days after
defendants served the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel to the Faces. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 74(b). The defendants complied with the rule and notified the Faces of their
obligation to appear or appoint counsel and no proceedings were held until 20 days

19

after the Faces were notified of their obligation. However, once notified of their
obligation to appear or appoint counsel, the Faces requested additional time to find
counsel and did not take any substantive action to move their case forward.
Defendants gave the Faces every opportunity to appear or appoint counsel and
did not prejudice their ability to do so. However, because the Faces were not
represented and refused to enter their own appearance, the defendants could not move
the case forward. Accordingly, on February 14, 2006, after the Faces had had nearly
five months to appear or appoint counsel and failed to do so, defendants filed a motion
to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. When the Faces failed to respond to the
motion after four months, defendants submitted the motion for decision.
The first of the five Westinghouse factors, conduct of the parties, therefore
supports the trial court's decision to dismiss. The record shows that the defendants
actively moved the case forward while the Faces were repeatedly dilatory and
essentially ignored their responsibility to prosecute their claim.
The second factor required the trial court to analyze "the opportunity each has
had to move the case forward." Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State Univ., 813 P.2d
1216, 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Here again, the record shows that the defendants
took advantage of their opportunity to move the case forward by deposing the Faces as
well as their medical providers and forensic experts. Additionally, the defendants tried
to push the case toward resolution by filing an Offer of Judgment pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. 68. (R. 101-102). The Faces similarly had ample opportunity to move the case
forward by conducting their own discovery and readying their case for trial. However,

once the Faces counsel withdrew after certifying the case ready for trial, the Faces
took no further action to move their case forward. They could have moved the case
forward by entering their own appearance or obtaining new counsel, but they failed to
do so. Here again, the second Westinghouse factor supports the trial court's dismissal
of the case.
The third factor required the trial court to look at "what each party has done to
move the case forward." Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State Univ., 813 P.2d 1216,
1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The trial court noted that the defendants' discovery efforts
were the primary force in moving the case forward. (R. 162). Conversely, after
certifying their case as ready for trial, the Faces failed to take any action to then move
the case forward. After their counsel withdrew and both defendants' counsel and the
trial court gave the Faces notice of their obligation to appear or appoint, the Faces
failed to appear or appoint counsel. Furthermore, the Faces also failed to oppose
defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. Other than certifying their
case as ready for trial in August 2005, the record shows that the Faces took no action
to move their case forward from January 2005 until the trial court granted defendants'
Motion to Dismiss in July 2006. The Faces can cite to no action or inaction by
defendants to support their failure to move the case forward, however even if they
could, dismissal would still be appropriate. "Although inaction on the part of a
defendant may contribute to the justifiability of a plaintiff s excuse for delay, the duty
to prosecute is a duty of due diligence imposed on a plaintiff, not on a defendant."
Country Meadows v. Dept. of Health, 851 P.2d 1212, 1216 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993). The
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Faces breached their duty of due diligence, and the trial court correctly determined that
the Faces' inaction favored dismissal under the third Westinghouse factor.
The fourth Westinghouse factor required the trial court to consider "the amount
of difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to the other side." Meadow
Fresh Farms v. Utah State Univ.. 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (UtahCt. App. 1991). Here,
the Faces inaction in general and their failure to appear or appoint counsel in particular
prejudiced the defendants because the defendants could not move the case forward.
After the Faces counsel entered his withdrawal, defendants counsel notified the Faces
that they had twenty days to appear or appoint counsel. In response, the Faces
requested an additional thirty days from the trial court, and the trial court granted their
request. At the expiration of that thirty day period, the Faces requested an additional
sixty days to appear or appoint. During this nearly four month period, the defendants
could not move the case forward because they were waiting on the Faces to fulfill their
procedural obligation. The defendants could not set the matter for trial and could not
pursue any additional discovery because the Faces were not represented and had not
entered an appearance in the case. The Faces' failure to appear or appoint counsel
effectively stalled the litigation and prejudiced the defendants' ability to move the case
forward. Accordingly, the fourth Westinghouse factor favors the trial court's dismissal
of the Faces' case.
Finally, the fifth factor required the trial court to determine whether injustice
would result from the dismissal. Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State Univ., 813 P.2d
1216, 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). With respect to this prong, the trial court stated:

To be sure, a dismissal will prejudice the Plaintiffs, who will then be
foreclosed from pursuing the relief sought. However, the Court's sense
of justice is not offended because of this outcome. It was completely
within the Plaintiffs' control to act, and they chose not to do so. The
Court and defendants have been more than patient and accommodating
to Plaintiffs' requests. In short, any "injustice" resulting from this
dismissal lies solely and exclusively with Plaintiffs.
(R. 162). The Faces had nearly nine months to appear or appoint counsel and take
some action to move their case forward. The trial court and defendants' counsel were
overly fair to the Faces by indulging their repeated requests for additional time to
retain counsel. However, the Faces were well aware that the trial court's and
defendants' patience was not unlimited. Both the trial court and defendants' counsel
informed the Faces of their obligation to move their case forward and yet they still
failed to do so. There can be no question that the trial court afforded the Faces an
opportunity both to be heard and to do justice, and they nevertheless abused that
opportunity through their dilatory conduct. The Faces' dilatory conduct cancels out
any injustice they sustained due to the dismissal of their claim.
The Faces argue that the Westinghouse factors do not support dismissal because
their case did not lie dormant for years on end. The Faces cite two cases where
dismissals for failure to prosecute were reversed on appeal even though the matters
had been pending for several years. They contend that their case is much less
egregious than those cases and thus the trial court erred. Appellants' Brief at p. 23.
Both cases are distinguishable.
In Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 335 P.2d 624 (Utah 1959), the Utah
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Supreme Court reversed a trial court's dismissal of plaintiff s complaint and
defendants' counterclaim for failure to prosecute. The case was an action to quiet title
that went on for many years. The plaintiff and defendants allowed the case to lie
dormant for nearly five years before the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
prosecute. Id. at p. 625. The trial court denied the motion. A couple months later, the
defendant filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice and the trial court granted the
motion. Id. The plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case because the plaintiffs' failed to
prosecute their claim. Id at 626. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed. Noting that
both the plaintiff and defendants' had asserted claims against the other, the court
stated: "Since any party to this action could have obtained the relief to which it was
entitled at any time had it wanted but both parties chose to dally for a number of years,
it was an abuse of discretion for the court to grant [defendants'] motion to dismiss with
prejudice." Id. at p. 626.
In this case, the defendants' did not choose to dally, but instead attempted to
move the case along. Conversely, the Faces allowed their claim to stand still and did
not take any action on it for nearly nine months. The defendants' could not move the
case forward due to the Faces' failure to appear or appoint counsel. Consequently, the
Crystal Lime case does not support the Faces' position.
The second case cited by the Faces, Wright v. Howe, 150 P. 956 (Utah 1915), is
likewise distinguishable. In Wright, the plaintiff sued the defendant to recover the
value of four horses that died after consuming defective linseed oil sold to plaintiff by
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the defendant. Id. at p. 589. After the matter had been pending in the trial court for
about three years, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute
alleging that "the plaintiff herein has failed and neglected to prosecute said action with
reasonable diligence." Id The trial court denied the motion and the case proceeded to
trial where the plaintiff prevailed. The defendant appealed and argued that the trial
court erred in denying its motion to dismiss. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion, stating: "The defendants had the same right
to press the action to trial that the plaintiff had, and if they were willing to permit it to
remain untried, and especially in the absence of any showing of prejudice, they cannot
complain." Id.
In this case, because the Faces failed to appear or appoint counsel, the
defendants could not move the case forward. When defendants attempted to do so, the
Faces responded with a request for more time to appear or appoint. After defendants
allowed the Faces nearly five months to appoint counsel or enter their own appearance,
they attempted to move the case forward by filing a motion to dismiss for failure to
prosecute. And the Faces failed to oppose the motion. The defendants were not
willing to permit the case to remain untried, but the Faces were. Accordingly, the
Wright case does not support the Faces' argument.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Faces' complaint.
After allowing the Faces nearly nine months to appear or appoint counsel and move
their case forward, the trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss which the
Faces did not oppose. As evidenced by the trial court's detailed memorandum
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decision, the trial court gave careful and detailed consideration to well-settled Utah
law and correctly determined that the Faces' dilatory conduct justified the dismissal of
their case.
III.

BECAUSE THE FACES RAISE ISSUES ON APPEAL THAT
THEY DID NOT RAISE OR PRESERVE IN THE TRIAL COURT,
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER THEM.

The Faces raise three new issues on appeal: (1) they argue that the trial
court erred in allowing their former counsel to withdraw; (2) they argue their
constitutional right to due process was violated due to their counsel's withdrawal;
and (3) they argue that their counsel's withdrawal somehow violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. The Faces did not raise or preserve
these issues in the trial court, and the trial court did not consider them. This Court has
stated that it will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Coombs v.
Juice Works Development, Inc., 2003 UT App 388 fn 3; 81 P.3d 769.

Accordingly,

this Court should disregard these arguments. However, should the Court elect to
entertain these issues, the Faces arguments are not well taken.
The Faces did not file or raise any objection to their counsel's withdrawal, and
the trial court did not err by allowing the withdrawal. The record evidences that the
Faces' counsel actually withdrew at the Faces' request. (R. 182, p. 2). In a telephone
conference with the trial court on September 16, 2005, counsel stated:
The Court: All right. I understand, Mr. Gruber, that you intend to
withdraw?
Mr. Gruber: I will withdraw at the direction of my clients, your Honor.
They have taken the files back from me about 10 days ago. They

informed me that they were looking for another attorney, or at least, as I
understand it, a second opinion - a new attorney in this case. I sent a
letter confirming that.
(R. 182, p. 2). The trial court then directed defendants' counsel to prepare an order
informing the Faces of their obligation to appear or appoint counsel within 20 days,
and the trial court set another scheduling conference for October 18, 2005. (R. 182, p.
5-6). Defendants' counsel prepared an order reflecting the trial court's ruling allowing
Mr. Gruber to withdraw and granting the Faces twenty days to appear or appoint
counsel. (R. 123-125). The order was filed with the court, served to the Faces'
counsel, and signed by the judge. (R. 123-125). Mr. Gruber then filed with the trial
court a formal notice of withdrawal and served the same to the Faces. (R. 117-120).
Furthermore, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 74(b), defendants' counsel served to the
Faces a notice to appear or appoint counsel informing them of their obligation to enter
an appearance or retain substitute counsel within twenty days. (R. 121-122). The
Faces do not deny that they received all of these pleadings and that they were fully
aware of their obligation to appear or appoint counsel. Moreover, the Faces do not
deny that they raised no objection with the trial court as to their counsel's withdrawal.
The trial court, the Faces' former counsel, and defendants' counsel all complied with
the procedural requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 74. Specifically, the Faces' former
counsel moved the trial court to allow his withdrawal, the trial court allowed
withdrawal pursuant to a written order, and defendants' counsel timely informed the
Faces of their obligation to appear or appoint counsel. Accordingly, the Faces'
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contention that the trial court erred by allowing their counsel to withdraw is without
merit.
The Faces also contend that their counsel's withdrawal violated their right to
due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution because they
were denied an opportunity to be heard as well as their day in court. The Faces cite no
authority to support their contention other than citing to Utah R. Civ. P. 74. They
claim that their former counsel, the trial court, and defendants' counsel failed to
comply with that rule's requirements for withdrawal of counsel. As set forth in the
preceding paragraph, their counsel, the trial court, and defendants' counsel all
complied with the procedural requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 74. Furthermore, the
Faces did have both an opportunity to be heard as well as an opportunity to have their
day in court. However, the Faces failed to seize those opportunities by neglecting to
enter their own appearance, neglecting to appoint counsel, and neglecting to oppose
defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute.
The Faces further contend that because Mr. Face alleges that he has a brain
injury he is entitled to protection under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
and the trial court should have "more reasonable steps in protecting his rights in this
action." Appellants' Brief at p. 29. ! The Faces again cite no authority to support their
contention. Moreover, they cite to no instance where they requested from the trial
court any relief or accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Indeed,
the only relief the Faces requested from the trial court was additional time to appear or
1
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appoint counsel. The trial court effectively granted the Faces nearly nine months to
appear or appoint counsel, but the Faces failed to do so. Consequently, the Faces'
argument fails.
The Faces were not unfairly taken advantage of in the proceedings below, the
Faces' procedural rights were not abused, and the Faces were not denied
accommodation by the trial court. The Faces cannot deny that they received notice of
their counsel's withdrawal. The Faces cannot deny that they were informed of their
obligation to appear or appoint counsel. The Faces cannot deny that they received
ample time from defendants' counsel and the trial court to enter their own appearance
or appoint counsel and to prosecute their case. The Faces never raised any objection to
their counsel's withdrawal in the proceedings below, and they should not be allowed to
do so now.
IV.

THE FACES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF COSTS.

The Faces assert that they are entitled to an award of costs, but cite no authority
or legal basis to support their assertion. Because the trial court properly exercised its
broad discretion in dismissing the Faces' claim for failure to prosecute, and because
the Faces have established no basis for their claim for appellate costs, this Court
should deny their request.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of defendants' Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. The Faces had over nine months to enter their own
appearance or retain new counsel and to take some action to move their case forward.
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Instead, they allowed the case to lie dormant for months on end. Moreover they failed
to oppose defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. There can be no
question that the Faces had ample opportunity to be heard and to do justice, but they
abused that opportunity by ignoring their obligation to appear or appoint counsel and
neglecting their burden to move their case forward. Consequently, the trial court's
dismissal of the Faces' complaint is an appropriate sanction for their dilatory conduct.
DATED this &I day of March, 2007.
PLANT. CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
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e 41. Dismissal of actions.
Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
1) By plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66(1), and of any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the
ntiff without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or other
)onse to the complaint permitted under these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal, the dismissal is without
udice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed
ny court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including the same claim.
2) By order of court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of dismissal under paragraph (1} of this subdivision of this rule, an action
i only be dismissed at the request of the plaintiff on order of the court based either on:
2)(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in the action; or
2)(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the
ice upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the
iterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under
paragraph is without prejudice.
nvoluntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a
indant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury,
completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not
rted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as
of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close
I the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in
rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an
dication upon the merits.
)ismissa! of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim,
s-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall
lade before a responsive pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing.
)osts of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon
eluding the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order for the payment of costs of the action previously
lissed as it may deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has complied with the order.
tond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. Should a party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
i, pursuant to Subdivision (a)(1)(i) above, after a provisional remedy has been allowed such party, the bond or undertaking filed in
)0rt of such provisional remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party against whom such provisional remedy
obtained.

Tab 2

e 74. Withdrawal of counsel.
An attorney may withdraw from the case by filing with the court and serving on all parties a notice of withdrawal. The notice of
idrawal shall include the address of the attorney's client and a statement that no motion is pending and no hearing or trial has been
If a motion is pending or a hearing or trial has been set, an attorney may not withdraw except upon motion and order of the court.
i motion to withdraw shall describe the nature of any pending motion and the date and purpose of any scheduled hearing or trial.
If an attorney withdraws, dies, is suspended from the practice of law, is disbarred, or is removed from the case by the court, the
osing party shall serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel on the unrepresented party, informing the party of the responsibility to
ear personally or appoint counsel. A copy of the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel must be filed with the court. No further
:eedings shall be held in the case until 20 days after filing the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel unless the unrepresented party
yes the time requirement or unless otherwise ordered by the court.
Substitution of counsel. An attorney may replace the counsel of record by filing and serving a notice of substitution of counsel signed
ormer counsel, new counsel and the client. Court approval is not required if new counsel certifies in the notice of substitution that
nsel will comply with the existing hearing schedule and deadlines.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

toMtyCbrk*

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
ROBERT AND JACKIE FACE.,
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE
TO PROSECUTE

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civ. No. 030905851

BEUTLER ENTERPRISES, INC., MOBILE
HOME TRANSPORTERS, and BYRON
CHESTER MOCK,
Defendants.

Judge Denise Posse Lindberg

%l
At issue before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute. After
reviewing the parties5 pleadings the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss the case with
prejudice, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Tf2
This case involves a suit filed on or about March 14, 2003 by Plaintiffs Robert and Jackie
Face alleging that defendants were negligent in the operation of a tractor-trailer causing personal
injury to Mr. Face, and a loss of consortium claim on behalf of Mrs. Face.
f3
An attorney planning report and proposed scheduling order were submitted to the Court
on or about May 13, 2003, but the Court declined to enter the Order because the proposed order
exceeded the presumptive time limits provided for by Court rules. In its minute entry declining
to sign the proposed order the Court noted that absent good cause for delay, the case would have
to be certified for trial within 330 days after the Answer was filed, or the it would be dismissed.
Tf4
An amended Case Management Order was approved by the Court on May 28, 2003.
Pursuant to that Order the parties indicated to the Court that the matter would be ready for trial
by March 5,2004.
f5
The parties exchanged initial disclosures and conducted discovery through the balance of
2003. On or about December 23, 2003 the parties submitted a Stipulation and Joint Motion for a
second amendment to the Case Management Order. The Court accepted the stipulation and
signed the proposed second amended Order . That Order extended the readiness for trial date to
October 1,2004.

%6
Based on the case record it appears that discovery continued through January 25, 2005.
After that date, no action appears to have taken place on the case, so the Court noticed the case
for an Order to Show Cause ("OSC") why the case should not be dismissed for failure to
prosecute. The OSC was scheduled for September 6, 2005. In response, Plaintiffs' counsel filed
a certificate of readiness for trial and asked that the OSC hearing be stricken.
f7
The Court then scheduled a telephonic conference with the parties, at which time counsel
for Plaintiffs informed the Court that he would be withdrawing as counsel and Plaintiffs would
secure new counsel. As a result of that telephonic conference the Court ordered that Plaintiffs
find new counsel or appear pro se within 20 days. Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 74, defendants
filed their notice to appear or appoint successor counsel. A follow up telephonic scheduling
conference was scheduled for October 18, 2005 to finalize what needed to occur to bring the
matter to trial.
f8
On the day prior to the scheduled telephonic conference, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for
Enlargement of Time to Appoint Counsel, seeking a thirty (30) day extension. Defendants did not
oppose that extension, and Plaintiffs were then given until November 18, 2005 to secure new
counsel.
Tf9
Again the day before that extension was to run out, Plaintiffs again filed another request
for extension of time, this time asking for an additional 60 days. Although there is no express
entry in the record, it appears that Defendants again acquiesced to the requested extension.
However, by February 14, 2006, Defendants apparently ran out of patience and filed the present
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b).
TflO
On February 27, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a third affidavit and Motion for Extension of time,
this time to respond to the Motion to Dismiss. Since that time, Plaintiffs have taken no further
action to move this case forward. On June 16, 2006, Defendants filed a notice to submit on their
motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs have not responded.
ANALYSIS
Tfl 1
The plaintiff bears the duty to prosecute its case with due diligence. Charlie Brown
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). If the
plaintiff fails to prosecute its case with due diligence, a trial court has discretion to dismiss the
plaintiffs case. WestinghouseElec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d
876, 879 (Utah 1975); Charlie Brown Constr. Co., Inc., 740 P.2d at 1370. The Utah Supreme
Court has set forth factors to help trial courts determine whether a party has shown a justifiable
excuse for its failure to prosecute. In addition to the length of time that has lapsed, the relevant
considerations are: "(1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each party has to move
the case forward; (3) what each party has done to move the case forward; (4) the amount of
difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to the other side; and (5) most important,
whether injustice may result from the dismissal." Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State
Univ., 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); accord Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 544
P.2d at 879. These factors are not to be considered in isolation. Country Meadows Convalescent

Ctr. v. Utah Dept. of Health Div. Of Health Care Fin., 851 P.2d 1212, 1215 (Utah Ct. App.
1993). Rather, the totality of the circumstances should be considered when determining if an
action should be dismissed for failure to prosecute with due diligence. Id.
f 12
As noted above, there has been no substantive action to move the case forward since
January 2005 when defendants conducted the last of their depositions of Mr. Face's treating
physicians. After the Court on its own motion scheduled the OSC hearing, the Plaintiffs'
counsel certified the matter for trial and then withdrew. Plaintiffs have been given extension
after extension to secure new counsel, yet they have utterly failed to do so. In fact, it is telling
that they have not even attempted to respond to the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants in
February 2006, other than to again ask for an extension of time.
T|13
It has been more than three (3) years since the case was filed, more than eighteen (18)
months since there was any substantive work on this case (and what discovery has occurred it
appears to have been driven primarily by the defendants), and over nine (9) months since the
Court initiated the OSC and Plaintiffs began seeking extensions of time. The Court believes
enough is enough. It is evident Plaintiffs have failed to fulfill their repeated promises to the
Court, and have been totally non-responsive since February 2006.
f 14
As referenced above, in evaluating a motion to dismiss the Court must consider what
actions, if any, were taken by each side in order to move the case forward. In this case, Plaintiffs
were clearly on notice of this Court's intention to manage its caseload and not allow matters to
languish for years without action. Once their counsel withdrew, Plaintiffs received repeated
extensions to appoint new counsel, all the while protesting that they could not represent
themselves.
TJ15 In contrast to Plaintiffs' inaction, it appears that the defendants have actively pursued this
action. They have engaged in substantial discovery, including deposing Mr. Face's treatment
providers.
Tfl6
Defendants have not addressed how they will be prejudiced if this matter is continued, but
that prong, by itself, is not determinative. The burden was on Plaintiffs to show why dismissal
would not be warranted on these facts, or to offer reasonable excuse for their lack of diligence.
Based on Plaintiffs' failure to respond to the motion to dismiss, and the fact they have remained
silent for the subsequent 5 months since the motion was filed, the Court can reasonably conclude
that Plaintiffs have nothing to offer that would justify their continued inaction.
f 17
To be sure, a dismissal will prejudice the Plaintiffs, who will then be foreclosed from
pursuing the relief sought. However, the Court's sense of justice is not offended because of this
outcome. It was completely within Plaintiffs' control to act, and they chose not to do so. The
Court and defendants have been more than patient and accommodating to Plaintiffs' requests, in
short, any "injustice resulting from this dismissal lies solely and exclusively with Plaintiffs.
1f 18
The Court realizes that dismissal with prejudice is a harsh sanction. The facts of this
case, however, amply justify this sanction.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER
119
Defendants' Motion To Dismiss with prejudice is GRANTED. This memorandum
decision shall serve as the final order and judgment in this case; the parties need not submit a
separate order.
Entered this 28th day of June, 2006.
BY THE
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on September 16, 2005)

3
4

THE COURT:
go.

Let me find the right file here.

This is the matter of Mr. Robert Face vs. —

is it Beutler?

5

MR. PLANT:

Yes.

6

THE COURT:

Enterprises, Inc. and it's case

7

No. 030905851.

8

again for the record?

9

Would you go ahead and enter your appearances

MR. GRUBER:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. GRUBER:

12
13
14
15
16

Jackie —

Here we

My name is Charles Gruber, G-r-u-b-e-r.
Yes.
Appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs,

Bob and Jackie Face.
MR. PLANT:

Your Honor, this is Terry Plant on behalf of

the defendants, Beutler Enterprises.
THE COURT:

All right.

I understand, Mr. Gruber, that

you intend to withdraw?

17

MR. GRUBER:

I will withdraw at the direction of my

18

clients, your Honor.

They have taken the files back from me

19

about 10 days ago.

20

another attorney, or at least, as I understand it, a second

21

opinion —

22

confirming that.

23

They informed me that they were looking for

a new attorney in this case.

I sent a letter

I made an agreement with them that I would —

it

24

wouldn't be sort of —

they wouldn't fall through the cracks and

25

I would continue to make the appearances for them on the

26

telephone status conference and that I would be available

~3~
1

for Terry to contact me so there wouldn't be a break in

2

communications either between defense counsel and the plaintiff

3

or between the Court and the plaintiffs.

4

I have not heard back from them.

I have confirmed that

5

in a letter to them.

So it is my understanding that they are

6

going to be substituting in another counsel.

7

from other counsel.

8

files, and I haven't heard from them.

9

that's what's going to be happening, that someone will be

I have not heard

It's been about 10 days since they took the
They do have the file, and

10

substituting in, it's my understanding, on my behalf.

I told

11

them that I would stand in for them because I don't want them to

12

be hurt for this kind of interim period.

13

your Honor.

That's where we are,

14

THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Plant?

15

MR. PLANT:

Well, your Honor, my —

and I understand,

16

and Mr. Gruber explained that yesterday very well.

17

was —

18

that there would be some sort of a deadline for them to take care

19

of this counsel issue.

20
21

My concern

and I understand why the Court got us back on the phone,

THE COURT:

That's right.

I mean I had set this up for

a scheduling conference to set a trial date.

22

MR. PLANT:

Uh-huh.

23

THE COURT:

Mr. Gruber, I don't want this to cause this

24
25
26

matter to kind of, you know, drag on indefinitely.
MR. GRUBER:

Sure, ans your Honor, I can assure you this

isn't a tactic, and I know Terry knows this that I wouldn't do

-41

this, but it' s not -- it's my clients honestly want someone else.

2

THE COURT:

I'm not concerned about that.

3

MR. PLANT:

No one is suggesting that.

4

THE COURT:

Yeah, not concerned about it at all.

5

MR. PLANT:

I just think, your Honor, this thing has

6

languished so long and we —

7

to have a date certain for them to do whatever they're going to

8

do so we can move the case along.

9

THE COURT:

you know, we need to —

we just need

That' s entirely appropriate and correct.

1

So

10

why don't we say 20 days f rom today in which to appear or appoint

11

counsel.

12

set it f<3r 20 days out.

Then let' s have a scheduling conference set —

13

MR. PLANT:

What is that?

14

THE COURT:

Hang on, let me grab my clerk.

15

MR. PLANT:

What is today?

16

THE COURT:

Christine?

17

Mr. Plant, will you prepare an order?

18

MR. PLANT:

Yeah, your Honor.

Tell me what day.

we'll

I'll

19

tell the Court, I've got a horrible trial coming that's going to

20

be three weeks that starts next -- a week from this Monday, so

21

I'm goin g to be

—

22

THE COURT:

23

which to appear or appoint •

24

MR. PLANT:

Okay.

25

THE COURT:

And prepare an order to that effect, and

26

then let ' s set —

1

Well, let's have it 20 days from today in

when does your trial end?

-51

MR. PLANT:

Probably, just to be safe, I better not set

2

anything until the week after —

3

thereabouts.

4
5

THE COURT:

the 24th of October, somewhere

Christine, can we set a telephone conference

sometime during that week?
CHRISTINE:

I show one on the 18th; do you want to cancel

8

THE COURT:

Are you in trial on the 18th?

9

MR. PLANT:

I might not be, but I —

10

THE COURT:

Yeah, let's

11

MR. PLANT:

—

12

THE COURT:

Let's

13

MR. PLANT:

Probably won't be, but you know how it goes.

14

THE COURT:

Well, let's leave it on the 18th where it

6
7

15

that one?

currently is.

—

I could be.
—

You set that yesterday?

16

MR. PLANT:

Right.

17

THE COURT:

All right.

Let's just leave that in place.

18

If it turns out that you can't make it just call and we'll

19

reschedule it.

20

MR. PLANT:

Okay.

21

THE COURT:

Okay?

22

MR. GRUBER:

23

memory?

Your Honor, just —

could I just refresh my

That's at 3:30 on the 18th?

24

THE COURT:

Yes.

25

MR. PLANT:

And so let me make sure, your Honor, so I

26

don't mess up the order, doing 3:30 on the 18th as a scheduling

-61

conference, and they have 20 days from today to appoint new

2

counsel or appear in person, right?

3

THE COURT:

Yes.

4

MR. PLANT:

And what's the downside if they don't?

5

THE COURT:

Well, we're moving forward.

6

MR. PLANT:

Okay, I get you.

7

THE COURT:

One way or another we're moving forward.

8

Now if Mr. Gruber were to withdraw right now there would be an

9

automatic 20 day per iod in which he would be required to give

10

notice

—

11

MR. PLANT: Right.

12

THE COURT:

—

and this is effectively the same thing,

13

but we have the benefit of having Mr. Gruber here and being able

14

to communicate with his clients.

15

MR. GRUBER:

16

THE COURT:

All right.

That would be perfect.

17

MR. PLANT:

All right.

So I'll prepare an order and get

18

I will call them and send a letter to them.

it over to you for approval, Charles, before you withdraw.

19

MR. GRUBER:

20

THE COURT:

Okay.

21

MR. PLANT:

Thank you.

22

MR. GRUBER:

23

THE COURT:

Okay, bye-bye.

24

MR. PLANT:

Thanks, your Honor.

25

MR. GRUBER:

26

(Hearing concluded)

Great, sounds good.
Thank you.

Thank you.

Thank you, your Honor.

I
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on October 18, 2005)

3

THE COURT:

Hello?

4

MS. FACE:

5

MR. PLANT:

Hello, Judge.

6

THE COURT:

This here is the matter of Robert and

Hello?

7

Jackie Face vs. Beutler Enterprises and others.

8

No. 030905851.

9

themselves, please?

10

MR. PLANT:

11

It's case

For the record would everybody identify

This is Terry Plant for the defendants, your

Honor.

12

MS. FACE:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. FACE:

15

THE COURT:

And I am Jackie Face, Robert L. Face's wife.
And do I have Robert on the phone, too?
Yes, you do.
All right.

I had set this for scheduling

16

purposes, and I've received and I've just reviewed, Mr. Face,

17

your ex parte application for an enlargement of time.

18

certainly not opposed to extending the time for the Faces to

19

obtain Counsel.

20

MR. PLANT:

Your Honor, I told Mrs. Face —

21

me —

22

give her —

23

November that we agreed to?

24

this is Terry Plant —

she called

about a week ago or so that I would

agreed to, I think —

THE COURT:

I'm

Mrs. Face, was it the 18th of

Mr. Face, you should send Mr. Plant a

25

copy of the ex parte enlarge —

motion for enlargement of time.

26

That's what was represented in the ex parte enlargement as well.

-31
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

I certainly appreciate that and think it's entirely appropriate.
MR. PLANT:

Your Honor, I have no objection.

In fact, I

already agreed to it subject only to your approval.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Well, I certainly appreciate that.

mean that's entirely appropriate under the circumstances.
Mr. and Mrs. Face, I think it —

will November 18th give

you sufficient time?
MS. FACE:

Your Honor, that would be of great help to us

if you could do that.
THE COURT:

Of course.

That's not a problem.

In fact,

11

Mr. Plant, I'm going to ask that you prepare the order extending

12

the time for Mr. and Mrs. Face to appear or appoint Counsel to

13

November the 18th.

14
15

MR. PLANT:

Did you say you were asking me to do that,

your Honor?

16

THE COURT:

I was.

17

MR. PLANT:

Okay.

18

THE COURT:

All right.

19

MR. PLANT:

The 18th of November, correct?

20

THE COURT:

The 18th of November, close of business the

I'll be happy to do that.

21

18th of November.

22

you have Counsel before then, notify Mr. Plant.

23

I

Then at that time would you notify Counsel, if

Mr. Plant, will you contact the Court and once you have

24

an idea of whether Mr. and Mrs. Face are proceeding pro se or

25

with Counsel to schedule a scheduling conference in this case so

26

that we can get it moving?
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MR. PLANT:

Sure.

2

THE COURT:

Until then I'm disinclined to schedule

3

I'll be happy to do that.

another scheduling conference unless somebody really wants one.

4

MR. PLANT:

5

MS. FACE:

6

THE COURT:

7

MS. FACE:

That makes sense.
Your Honor, may I speak?
Of course.
This is Jackie.

I have —

we have actively

8

been seeking Counsel, and the last attorney that we talked to

9

there was a conflict there of Counsel.

So we are definitely busy

10

trying to find someone to represent us.

We certainly do not want

11

to be pro se.

12

THE COURT:

13

MS. FACE:

14

THE COURT:

15

MS. FACE:

17

THE COURT:

Thank you so much.
No problem.

I'll give you the time that you

Thank you so much.
That's no problem.

So why don't you —

you obtain Counsel if you would do me the courtesy

19

MS. FACE:

20

THE COURT:

21

—

need.

16

18

I understand, and I

when

—

Certainly will.
All right.

All right, is there anything

else that anybody needs?

22

MR. PLANT:

No.

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

I'll prepare an order, your Honor.
Mr. Face, the reason I didn't scrub

24

the telephone conference is it was purely for this purpose, to

25

make sure we're all on the same page and to set a time certain

26

for you to get Counsel.

-5MS. FACE:

Thank you.

MR. FACE:

Thank you.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. PLANT:

Sir?

MS. FACE:

All right.

Thank you very much.

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

MR. PLANT:

See you.

THE COURT:

Bye.

MS. FACE:
THE COURT:

Bye.
Bye-bye.

(Hearing concluded)
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